A Logical Approach to Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Graham by David DeVidi, Tim Kenyon PDF

By David DeVidi, Tim Kenyon

ISBN-10: 1402035330

ISBN-13: 9781402035333

The papers during this assortment are united through an method of philosophy. They illustrate the manifold contributions that good judgment makes to philosophical growth, either by way of the applying of formal how to conventional philosophical difficulties and by way of beginning up new avenues of inquiry as philosophers tackle the results of recent and infrequently striking technical effects. Contributions contain new technical effects wealthy with philosophical importance for modern metaphysics, makes an attempt to diagnose the philosophical importance of a few fresh technical effects, philosophically stimulated proposals for brand spanking new methods to negation, investigations within the historical past and philosophy of common sense, and contributions to epistemology and philosophy of technology that make crucial use of logical strategies and effects. the place the paintings is formal, the reasons are patently philosophical, now not in basic terms mathematical. the place the paintings is much less formal, it truly is deeply proficient via the correct formal fabric. the quantity comprises contributions from one of the most fascinating philosophers now operating in philosophical good judgment, philosophy of common sense, epistemology and metaphysics.

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Extra resources for A Logical Approach to Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Graham Solomon

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Ex. Conversely, define α(y) ≡ ϕ(0, y). Then, assuming Ex, there is b for which ∃yα(y) → α(b), so ∀x ∈ 1∃yϕ(x, y) → ∀x ∈ 1ϕ(x, b). Defining f ∈ Fun(1) by f = { 0, b } gives ∀x ∈ 1∃yϕ(x, y) → ∀x ∈ 1ϕ(x, f x), and AC∗ 1 follows. 3 DAC∗ 1 and Un are equivalent over IST. Proof. Given α, define ϕ(x, y) ≡ α(y). Then, for f ∈ Fun(1), ∃x ∈ 1ϕ(x, f x) ↔ α(f 0) and ∃x ∈ 1∀yϕ(x, y) ↔ ∀yα(y). DAC∗ 1 then gives ∃f ∈ Fun(1)[α(f 0) → ∀yα(y)], from which Un follows easily. Conversely, given ϕ, define α(y) ≡ ϕ(0, y).

He knows the presupposition holds as long as he has no reason to suspect otherwise. That is, Karl’s belief in Ce (Φ) is justified to the extent that he has no reason to suspect that Ce (Φ) is false. Of course, if Karl did have a reason to doubt Ce (Φ), this would contribute to undermining his knowledge of Φ. This is the way of presuppositions. Perhaps Karl can determine by introspection and reasoning that he has no reason to doubt Ce (Φ). This may count as some sort of (defeasible) internal but negative warrant for Ce (Φ), and we might say that the external component Ce (Φ) for knowledge of Φ only has, and only needs, this negative warrant.

If so, then if we opt for an externalist epistemology, we lose the basic motivation for the KK-thesis. Of course, this does not entail that the KK-thesis fails on a particular externalism. Nevertheless, there is a widespread view that the KK-thesis does fail on externalist epistemologies. Part of the entry on “externalism” in Simon Blackburn’s Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy reads: In the theory of knowledge, externalism is the view that a person might know something by being suitably situated with respect to it, without that relationship being in any sense within his purview.

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A Logical Approach to Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Graham Solomon by David DeVidi, Tim Kenyon


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